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ABSTRACT

This study discusses navigability concepts,
consumptive rights to surface and ground waters, the
disposal of diffused surface waters and the administration of Kentucky's statutory water allocation
system.
Federal regulatory powers are based on navigability as is state ownership of submerged lands.
Kentucky uses the ebb-and-flow test of navigability
to determine title to submerged lands but uses a
navigability-in-fact test to determine the scope of
state regulatory authority.

Consumptive uses of

water in Kentucky are governed by the riparian landowner to use as much water as he needs as long as
his use does not interfere with the legitimate uses
of other riparians.

Underground streams are subject

to the same consumptive use rules, but an overlying
landowner can use as much percolating ground water
as he needs even though other users are harmed.
Kentucky follows the civil law rule with respect to
the disposal of diffused surface water, but recent
cases seem to have applied the more modern reasonable use rule.

ii

In addition to these common-law rules, the
Department for Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection, under the provisions of KRS Chapter 151,
administers a permit system under which both riparian and nonriparian users are allowed to make
beneficial uses of water.

The permit system, how-

ever, is not particularly comprehensive, and is
subject to various criticisms.

Descriptors:
Legal Aspects*, Legislation, Water Law*, Water
Policy, Water Resources Development
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INTRODUCTION

Drastically increased demands upon the nation's
water resources may develop in the coming years
because of population growth, increased per capita
use of water, and the progressive concentration
of population in urban areas.

1

The population of the United States has grown
from 76 million in 1900 to 204 million in 1970,
and projections indicate that this trend is likely

.
2
t o con t inue.
Per capita use of water is also rising.

Be-

cause of industrialization, per capita use of water
in America increased from 526 to 1893 gallons
daily per person during the first six decades of
this century. 3

As industrial growth continues,

4
.
.
per capita
water use wi· 11 a 1 so increase.

Water problems are also created by urban concentration.

By 1980 it is estimated that more than

half of the population will live in urban areas
of more than 50,000 persons. 5

This urbanization

will put a severe strain on the nation's water resources since the water-holding capacity of an area
is reduced when rural lands are converted into
high-density residential uses.

1

At the present time, Kentucky's water resources
are substantial.

Kentucky has 544 square miles of

mountain streams, rivers, lakes, and reservoirs. 6
The Commonwealth's average yearly precipitation of
of 46 inches produces about 100 million acre-feet
of water annually.

7

However, according to the

Department for Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection, water demand will increase in the future for agriculture, industry, municipal uses,
recreation and pollution control.
Although natural rainfall and storage ponds
should provide adequate water for agricultural uses,
irrigation is continually increasing, especially
for tobacco.

Industry is the heaviest use of

Kentucky in water, accounting for two-thirds of
present water used, while smaller amounts are used
for commercial purposes.

Chemicals, paper and

metals are industrial uses in Kentucky which require large amounts of water.

The state's growing

metropolitan areas, Louisville, Lexington, Covington-Newport, Ashland, Owensboro, Bowling Green and
Paducah, will all require greater quantities of
water, although no shortages are imminent.

Large

quantities of water are required to support wildlife, and planning is needed to control minimum

2

stream flows and lake levels.

Kentucky's recrea-

tional potential depends greatly upon sound water
management.

Finally, increasing amounts of stream

water will be needed to purify polluted discharge.
Although Kentucky's water resources are sufficient to meet immediate needs, they are not unlimited,
and competition among
occur in the future.

the state's water users may
Moreover, the introduction of

new high-water use industries such as coal gasification and liquefaction could accelerate this
process in some areas of the state.

Kentucky's

water allocation system may eventually have to be
s~bstantially modified in order to maximize use
of that resource.

Ideally, proposals for such

changes should be made before a serious breakdown
of the allocation system occurs.

This study is

intended as a preliminary step in that direction.
Each of the five sections of this study examines a different facet of Kentucky water law,
Section 1 deals with the rights of landowners whose
property lies adjacent to a water course.

Concepts

of navigability as they relate to federal regulatory powers and the ownership of submerged lands,
are discussed.

Kentucky uses the "ebb and flow"

test of navigability in order to determine owner-

3

ship of submerged lands, while the "navigabilityin-fact" test is employed where the public right
of navigation is concerned.
Consumptive use rights in contained surface
waters are explored in section 2.

The riparian

system prevails in most of the eastern states,
while most of the western states subscribe to the
prior appropriation system.

Riparian jurisdictions

generally follow the reasonable use rule, but some
utilize the older natural flow doctrine.

Under the

natural flow doctrine, the riparian owner, except
for domestic purposes, may not cause

the flow of

the watercourse to diminish appreciably,

The

reasonable use rule, which Kentucky follows allows
the riparian owner to utilize as much water as he
needs as long as it does not interfere with the
rights of other users.
Section 3 examines consumptive uses of ground
water.

Ground waters are classified as either

underground streams or percolating ground water,
Consumptive use rights in underground streams
are the same as those of contained surface waters.
However, there are four positions associated with
the use of percolating ground water:

the absolute

ownership doctrine, the reasonable use rule, the

4

correlative rights doctrine, and the prior appropriation system.
The absolute ownership doctrine permits the
landowner to extract an unlimited amount of water
for use on overlying or distant lands regardless
of injury to other users.

The reasonable use

rule limits a landowner's use to beneficial purposes
on overlying land even though it interferes with
the uses of others.

The correlative rights doctrine

restricts the use of water to overlying lands and
also requires that it be reasonable in relation to
the needs of other users.

Finally, in some west-

ern states the prior appropriation doctrine is
applied to ground water.

Under this approach, the

first landowner who puts the water to beneficial use
has priority over subsequent appropriators during
periods of shortage.
Diffused surface water is discussed in section
4.

A landowner normally has a right to impound

and use any diffused surface water on his property.
There are three doctrines, however, that relate to
the disposal of such waters:

the common enemy rule,

the civil law rule and the reasonable use rule.
According to the common enemy rule the landowner
may take any action to prevent diffused surface

5

water from coming upon his property, while under
the civil law rule the upper owner has an easement
upon the lower owner's property for the water to
drain in its natural manner.

The reasonable use

rule provides for liability due to interference
with the natural flow of diffused surface waters
if the defendant's is deemed to be unreasonable or
negligent,

Kentucky once followed the civil law,

but now seems to adhere to the reasonable use
rule.
Section 5 is concerned with Kentucky's water
regulatory legislation.

Under the provisions of

KRS chapter 151, the Division of Water Resources,
operating within the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, deals with
water use problems in the state.

Consumptive

uses of water are regulated by a permit system.
Parties who wish to withdraw, divert or transfer
water must obtain a permit from the Division, but
many water users are exempted from this requirement.

The right granted under the permit is

specific in terms of quantity and rate of diversion.
Nonriparians can apply for permits, and the transfer
of water from one watershed to another is permitted.
Water rights under the permit are granted for an

6

indefinite period, but the agency may make temporary allocations during periods of shortage.

7

1.

(a)

NAVIGABLE WATERS

Property Rights in Navigable Waters
Landowners whose property borders on a nav-

igable watercourse commonly possess riparian
rights.

9

These include a right to make consumptive

use of the water as well as a right of access 10
to the water.

Riparian landowners also share with

other members of the public the right to navigate, 11
. or b a th e in
' a d.Jacent naviga
. bl e
f i· sh, 12 and swim
13
waters,
subject, however, to reasonable regulation
by the government in the exercise of its police
power.

14

Riparian property is also subject to the doctrines of accretion, reliction, avulsion,
sion.15

Accretion

and ero-

adds to the land by the gradual

deposit by water of sand, s'ediment or other materiai.16

Reliction occurs when submerged land is

exposed by the imperceptible recession of the water.

17

Erosion is the gradual and imperceptible

wearing away of land bordering on a body of water
by the natural action of the elements.

18

Avulsion

is either the sudden and perceptible alteration of
the shoreline by action of the water, or a sudden
change of the bed or course of a stream forming

8

a boundary whereby it abandons its old bed for a
new one.

19

As a general rule, where the shoreline is gradually and imperceptibly altered by accretion, reliction or erosion, the riparian owner's boundary
line also shifts in the same direction.

The

landowner thus acquires title to all additions
arising by accretions or reliction, and loses soil
that is worn or washed away by erosion.

20

However,

any change in the shoreline that takes place
suddenly and perceptibly does not result in a change
.

o f b oun d ary or owners h ip,

21

Although a landowner may not intentionally increase his estate through accretions or reliction
. l
b y arti"f'icia

means, 22

he may acquire additions

resulting from artificial conditions created by
third persons without his consent.
(bl

23

Ownership of Submerged Lands

(i)

The Public Trust Doctrine
In addition to other rights, riparian

landowners sometimes possess rights in the
streambed itself.
lands, however,

Rights to these submerged
often depend

upon whether

the watercourse is navigable or not.

9

While

the beds under nonnavigable waters are subject to
.
t e owners h'ip, 24
priva

those under navigable

waters are usually held in trust by the state
for the corrunon use and benefit of its citizens.

25
This rule is derived from the English

corrunon law.

The common law in England dis-

tinguished between the proprietary interests
of the sovereign and the rights of the public
in tidal waters.

The former was known as

jus privatum while the latter was called
.

JUS

pu bl.icum. 26

Although the King could

convey his private interest in the soil, he
could not thereby impair the public's right
t'ion. 27
.
t o naviga

Unlike the jus privatum,

the public right to navigation extended to
navigable fresh watercourses, as well as
tidal waters, even where the beds were privately owned.

28

Thus, in England, ownership

of the submerged bed was not an inevitable
consequence of navigability.
On the other hand, in America, the protection of public rights in navigable waters
was associated with ownership of submerged
lands.

29

This concept, known as the public

10

trust doctrine may be traced in a series of federal cases beginning with Martin v. Wadde11, 30
decided in 1842.

The plaintiff in that case

claimed an exclusive right of fishery through
a grant from the colonial propreitor.

The

Court declared that the dominion and property
in the tidal waters were an aspect of the
proprietor's governmental powers and could
not be conveyed to private citizens.

Accord-

ingly, the colonial grant was declared invalid.
Shortly thereafter, in Pollard's Lessee
v. Hagan,

31

the United States Supreme Court

determined that new states must be admitted
on an equal footing with existing states,
and that title to tidelands in Mobile Bay vested in the state of Alabama upon its admission
to the Union in 1819.

In Shively v. Bowlby,

32

the Court declared that prior to statehood,
the federal government held the beds of tidal
waters in trust for the citizens of the future
state and could not alienate such lands in any
way that would impair the trust.
The fullest exposition of the public
trust doctrine, however, appeared in Illinois

11

Central Railroad Company v. Illinois
1893.

33

in

The Court stated that the title under

which Illinois held the navigable waters of
Lake Michigan was a "trust devolving upon
the state for the public • • . which can only
be discharged by the management and control
of property in which the public has an interest, and cannot be relinquished by a transfer of property."

34

In its present form,

therefore, the public trust doctrine constitutes a substantial limitation of the power of
states to dispose of lands under navigable
waters. 35

The doctrine has traditionally been

employed to protect public rights to navigation, commerce and fishing, 36 and in some
states has also been utilized to protect recreational interests.
(ii)

37

Navigability for Title Purposes
Various tests of navigability have been

used for purposes of determining ownership
of

submerged lands.

38

Common law rights

to submerged lands were associated with tidal
effect. 39

Tidal waters included the foreshore

and "arms and creeks of the sea" as far as
the ebb and flow of the tide extended.

12

Lands

under such waters belonged "prima facie" to the
Crown, although they could be conveyed into
private ownership. 40
In America some states retained the
"ebb and flow" test for purposes of determining ownership of submerged lands. 41
However, beginning with Carson v. Blazer 42 in

1810, a majority of states adopted a "navigability-in-fact" test.

43

This formula has

also been utilized by the federal courts to
determine the ownership of submerged lands.
The federal navigability test with respect to ownership of submerged lands does
not require that the waters be navigable in
interstate commerce, intrastate navigability
..
ff. .
44
l.S SU l.Cl.ent.

It is immaterial that the

watercourse is not presently used for commerce
or that it has not been used for many years,
so long as it was used or was susceptible of
commercial use at the time that the state was
admitted to the Union.
Holt State Bank

46

45

United States v.

which involved a dispute

over the title to the bed of Mud Lake in
northern Minnesota, is the leading case.

The

federal government asserted that Mud Lake was

13

not navigable under state law and had remained
in federal ownership.

The defendants maintained

that the lake in its natural condition was navigable, that the state had acquired ownership of
the bed upon admission to the Union.

The

Supreme Court found the lake to be navigable
but indicated that navigability, when asserted
as the basis of a right arising under· the
Federal Constitution, was a question of federal law.
(iii)

47

Ownership of Submerged Lands in Kentucky
Kentucky adheres to the ancient "ebb and

flow" test of navigability for purposes of
determining the ownership of submerged beds.

48

Since no watercourse in Kentucky is subject
to the influence of the tides, in theory all
submerged lands are privately owned.

49

Presumably the federal test of navigability
set forth in Holt State Bank would not apply
to Kentucky since the state was not created
out of federal public domain land and was
never subject to federal ownership.
As a general rule, the title of landowners along nonnavigable streams extends to
the thread of the stream,

14

50

and the amount of

submerged land owned is dependent upon the
frontage possessed by the landowner.

51

Un-

til recently, however, this principle was
uncertain in Kentucky. The Court in Berry v.
52
Snyder
held that riparian ownership extended
to the middle thread of the main channel,
rather than to the center of the stream itself,
and subsequent decisions on this issue were
.
53
se ld om consistent.

Finally in Louisville

Sand & Gravel Co. v. Ralston, 54 the Court
held that the "thread of the stream", as
applied to the Ohio River, meant the middle
line as measured from the State's northern
boundary, the low water mark on the northern
shore to the corresponding lew water mark on
the southern shore.
In the case of nonnavigable lakes, landowners usually own to the center,

55

but spec-

ial rules have evolved with respect to the
rights of boating, swimming and fishing on the
surface of the lake.

56

The common law position

restricts each owner to the use of the water
immediately over his portion of the bed and
treats any intrusion as a trespass.

57

Other

states subscribe to the civil law or common

15

use approach, which allows the owner of a
portion of the bed to use the surface of the
entire lake for fishing, boating and swimming,
as long as he does not unreasonably interfere
with the rights of other proprietors. 58
There are no cases on this issue in Kentucky.
(cl

Public Regulatory Powers Over Navigable Waters
(i)

Federal Regulatory Authority Under the
Commerce Clause
Federal regulatory activity over water

resources is based primarily on the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution.

59

The

Supreme Court first recognized the power of
the federal government to regulate navigation
and general commercial relations in 1824. 60
Later in Gilman v, Philadelphia,

61

the Court

stated that the power to regulate navigation
and commerce permitted the government to keep
the navigable waters free from obstruction
to navigation "imposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they
exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they
may deem proper, against the occurrence of the
evil and for the punishment of offenders•.
Since then, both the concept of navi-

16

62

gability and the scope of federal regulatory
power have broadened considerably.
Genesse Chief v. Fitzhugh,
vanced was a factual one:

63

In The

the test ad-

if the stream was

navigable in fact, it was navigable for
purposes of regulation under the commerce
clause.

This test was later reaffirmed by

the Court in The Daniel Bali.

64

The Court held that nonnavigable waters
affected the navigable capacity of a river
were also subject to federal regulation. 65
Finally in United States v. Appalachian
Power Co.,

66

the Court declared that a

watercourse that was nonnavigable in its
natural state would be considered navigable
for purposes of Federal commerce clause
jurisdiction if it could be made navigable
by means of reasonable improvements.
The federal test of navigability for
commerce clause purposes now covers any
stream, river or lake that affords a channel
for useful commerce, whether navigable in
its natural state or not, or whether, as a
result of reasonable improvement, it could
be made so.

In the event the water in question

17

fits this definition, the federal government
has authority to undertake necessary regulations to protect its federal interest in
·
t 'ion.
naviga

67

h' power is
. su ff'icient
.
Tis
to

override contrary state regulations.
(ii)

68

State Regulation Powers Over Navigable
Waters
Although the federal government's regula-

tory authority over navigable waters is
superior to that of the states, it is not
exclusive.
Although the states may exercise some
control over nonnavigable waters within their
borders, 69 their authority over navigable
waters is usually much more extensive.

70

Accordingly, the scope of the state's regulatory power for purposes of protecting
public rights is usually a function of its
test for navigability.

Most states utilize

the navigability-in-fact test for regulatory
purposes.

Under this approach, a watercourse

is considered navigable when it is used, or is
susceptible of being used, in its ordinary
condition, as a highway of commerce, over which
trade and travel can be conducted in the

18

customary fashion.

71

Some states, however,

have rejected commercial use as a test of
navigability and substituted for it a recreational or "pleasure boat" standard.

72

Other

states have broadened their notions of commerce
to include some recreational uses.
Luscher v. Reynolds,

73

In

for example, the

Oregon court stated that "a boat used for
the transportationof pleasure seeking passengers is, in a legal sense, as much engaged
in commerce as is a vessel transporting a
shipment of lumber.
(iii)

074

Regulation of Navigable Waters in
Kentucky
Kentucky follows the navigability-in-

fact test for purposes of determining the extent of public navigation rights in such
waters. 75

If a stream in its natural con-

ditions is capable of being used for that
purpose, the public has an easement of navi.
.
"t 76
ga t 1.on
1.n
1..

Thus, a watercourse suscept-

ible at certain periods of the year to valuable
use for the purpose of floating logs to market
77
is deemed to that extent, a navigable stream.
Moreover, a navigable capacity of the stream

19

need not be continuous, as long as its
periods of high water and navigable capacity
continue a sufficient length of time to

' use f u 1 as a h'ig hway. 78
mak e it

20

2,

CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS IN SURFACE
WATERCOURSES

(a)

Riparian Rights
Consumptive rights to contained surface waters

are governed by two major allocation systems,
riparianism and prior appropriation.

The doctrine

of prior appropriation prevails in the western
states.

79

Under this system beneficial use of

water, not land ownership, is the source of the
right, and priority of use is the basis of allocation among appropriators in periods of shortage,

80

The water use is not confined to riparian land, and
with a few exceptions, the water can be used anywhere it is needed.

Finally, an appropriation is

always stated in terms of the right to take a
definite quantity of water.
Riparian rights, on the other hand, arise from
ownership of land that borders on a watercourse.

81

Under this regime, water may only be used on riparian land. 82

The riparian character of a tract of

land may be determined according to the source of
title test, under which riparian rights extend
only to the smallest tract held under one title
in a chain of title leading to the present owner.

21

83

A more liberal approach

is the unity of title test,

under which riparian rights extend to all contig84
.
.
.
uous 1 an d owne d b ya riparian proprietor.
In
addition, some courts have held that only that
portion of a tract'which lies within the same
watershed can be considered as riparian.

85

Limitations on the use of water to riparian
land have not, however, been strictly observed
in many jurisdictions.

Thus, it is often recognized

that a riparian may grant to another person,
whether a riparian or not, all or part of the riparian's right to the use of the water, 86

But

while the grantee of this right may be able to
enforce it as against his riparian granter, he is
unable to assert it successfully against other
riparians who may interfere with his use of the
water, or whose uses or rights may be interfered
. h b y h"is use. 87
wit

(i)

The Natural Flow Doctrine
There are two forms of riparianism, the

natural flow doctrine and the reasonable use
rule,

At the present time only four states

.
88 wh'i l e
adhere to the natura 1 fl ow d octrine,
the remaining riparian jurisdictions utilize

22

the reasonable use rule.

Under the natural

flow doctrine, each riparian proprietor on a
watercourse is entitled to have the stream
flow through his land in its natural condition,
undiminished and unpolluted by others. 89
Water uses are classified as natural
or artificial.

A natural or domestic use of

water arises out of the necessities of the
riparian land, including household uses, drinking water, and watering of a reasonable number
of domestic animals.

The domestic use is a

favored one, and a riparian may use as much
water as desired, even the entire flow of the
watercourse.

90

However, a riparian may make

an artificial use only where it will not harm
other riparians by substantially affecting
the flow of the watercourse.

91

Artificial

uses are not directly related to the necessities
of life on riparian land.

Examples of arti-

ficial uses include business and trade uses,
irrigation, mining operations, generation of
power, and watering of large herds of stock.
(ii)

The Reasonable Use Rule
The reasonable use theory is based on the

23

rationale that natural watercourses exist
primarily for the use and benefit of mankind,
not merely to be maintained in their natural
state.

This theory emphasizes the right to

use water, as opposed to the natural flow
idea of having a stream flow in a particular
way.

Under the reasonable use theory, each

riparian is entitled to use the water for any
beneficial purpose, on the condition that his
use is reasonable and does not unreasonably
interfere with a neighboring riparian's right. 92
Thus, riparian rights under the reasonable use
rule are correlative:

no one riparian land-

owner can use more than use share of the water.
Existing users must adjust their consumption of
water to accommodate new riparian users, and
riparian users must all reduce their water use
during periods of water shortage.

A similar concept applies to water quality.

Riparians have a limited right vis a vis

other riparians to discharge pollutants into a
watercourse.

However, such conduct will be

deemed unreasonable and can be enjoined if it
. 11 y inJures
. .
·
·
su b stantia
ano ther riparian
user. g3

The distinction between natural and arti-

24

ficial uses discussed above in connection with
the natural flow theory, however, also applies
to the reasonable use rule, and domestic uses
are always superior to artificial uses such as
.
.
.
94
1.rr1.gat1.on.

(bl

Riparian Rights in Kentucky
Although Kentucky is clearly a riparian state,

for many years it was unclear whether it followed
the natural flow doctrine or the reasonable use
rule.

In many cases the Court of Appeals treated

the two doctrines as if they were equivalent to each
other.

Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern Railway,

95

the first case to discuss riparian rights in Kentucky, is illustrative of this confusion.

The

plaintiff in the Anderson case owned a grist mill
on a small creek.

Two miles above the mill the

defendant railroad company constructed a small
dam to supply a reservoir of water for its trains.
The dam however, interferred with the plaintiff's
mill.
The Court declared that "[t]he right of every
riparian owner to the enjoyment of a stream of
running water in its natural state in flow, quantity, and quality is now well established.

96

This

language indicates that the Court was adopting the

25

natural flow theory.

Later portions of the opin-

ion, however, were suggestive of the reasonable use
rule:

97
The owner is entitled to the reasonable
use of the water for natural and domestic
purposes; but when he undertakes to divert the course of the stream, or detain
the water by means of a dam, so as to
prevent the previous supply to other
riparian owners, he became a wrongdoer • • •
The use and detention of
the water on a large stream by means of
of a dam, for purposes of the railroad,
might not be an unreasonable use, as
ordinarily there would be ample water left
for all the purposes of the riparian owners below; yet, where the stream is small,
or even large, if the dam so obstructs the
water as to diminish the flow and lessen
the capacity of the water power below,
it is an injury to the proprietor for
which damages may be awarded.

In the end the Court reversed the lower Court's
decision for the plaintiff and remanded the case for
a new trial.

The Court stated that no recovery could

be had by the plaintiff unless the use of the water
by the defendant caused his material injury - a
question of fact for the jury to determine.
Many of the Kentucky cases involved impairment of water quality rather than strictly consumptive uses.

In Kraver· v. Smith,98 a distillery

was polluting a stream by discharging waste therein.
The court granted an injunction to a lower riparian
on the theory that the riparian was" • • • entitled
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to the natural flow of the water, unimpaired in
quality, except as may be occasioned by reasonable use of the stream by other proprietors." 99
Pollution, therefore, is not a reasonable use under
this standard.
Later, in Fackler
Co., 1° 0

v.

Cincinnati N.O.

the court declared " • •

&

T.R.C.

[a] proprietor

is entitled to have the water of a stream flow
to his land in its natural course undiminished in
quantity and unimpaired in quality." 101
City of Louisville v. Tway,
less clear.

102

however, was

In this case, the defendant dammed

a stream, thereby reducing the velocity of its flow.
The reduced flow resulted in a pollution problem
for the plaintiff.

The court stated that:

It is true, as suggested by counsel
for appellant, that our court is committed to the "natural flow rule" though
as we read the two rules (reasonable use)
• • • the distinction is rather close, and
even under what may be termed the more
restricted theory (natural flow), . • •
each riparian owner is recognized as
having a privilege to use the water to
supply his natural wants, and extraordinary or artificial uses, so that such does
not sensibly or materially affect the
quantity of the water and such uses by the
lower riparian owner.103
The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed
to show that the defendants had made "unreasonable
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use of the water from the stream",

It also de-

clared, however, that the defendants' darn "did not
appreciably affect the flow of water" in the stream.
The Court upheld the lower court's refusal to grant
injunctive relief since the defendant's actions
had not caused any demonstrated harm to the plaintiff's property.
This continuing uncertainty between the natural
flow and reasonable use theories led in 1954 to a
104
legislative adoption of the reasonable use rule:
The owner of land continguous to
public water shall have the right to such
reasonable use of this water for other
than domestic purposes as will not deny
the use of such water to other owners for
domestic purposes or impair existing
uses of other owners heretofor established,
or unreasonably interfere with a beneficial use by other owners.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted a general formulation of the rule in Daugherty v. City
of Lexington. 105

In this case the city of Lexing-

ton denied a building permit to the plaintiff who
had plans to build a restaurant, because he failed
to show that his septic tank system would not endanger the purity of city water in a nearby city
reservoir.

The plaintiff argued that his proposed

restaurant would be a reasonable use of his land.
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The court quoted from a Michigan case, Fe·ople v.
Hulbert,

106

which set forth a reasonable use form-

ula for water: 107
• • in determining whether a use is
reasonable we must consider what the use
if for, its extent, duration, necessity,
and its application; the nature and size
of the stream, and the several uses
to which it is put; the extent of the
injury to the one propietor and of the
benefit to the other; and all other
facts which may bear upon the reasonableness of the use.
According to the Court, the determination of reasonable use is a question of fact to which a balancing
test must be applied.

The necessity of the use of

water must be considered and balanced against the
harm which would ensue from the use.
Thus it seems that Kentucky firmly adheres
to the reasonable use rule insofar as common-law
riparian rights are concerned.
be a sound choice.

This appears to

Despite its limitations,

the reasonable use rule is a more efficient and
realistic approach to water allocation than the
obsolete natural flow doctrine.
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3.

CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS TO GROUND WATER

(a~

Consumptive Use Rules
There are two legal categories of ground

water, underground streams and percolating waters,
and a distinct set of legal rules is associated
wi"th eac h • 108

Underground streams flow in fixed

or definite channels 109 and are governed by the
same rules that apply to surface watercourses.

110

Percolating waters are subsurface waters which,
without any permanent or definite channel, ooze,
seep or filter through the soil beneath the surface.

111

Ground water is presumed to be percolating

unless it is affirmatively shown that the water is
flowing in an underground stream.

112

There are four doctrines that deal with the
allocation of percolating ground water:
English or absolute ownership doctrine;
American or reasonable use rule;

(1)

the

(2) the

(3) the correlat-

ive rights doctrine; and (4) the prior appropriation
system.
The English or absolute ownership rule was first
ennunciated in Acton

v. Blundell

113

in 1842.

this doctrine, the landowner may extract an un-
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Under

limited amount of percolating ground water from
his land and use it on either overlying or distant lands, regardless of injury to adjacent
landowners.

114

The rule is normally interpreted

to hold a user liable only for waste or formal. .
. .
t o h.is neig
. hb or 115 an d in
. some
icious
inJury
jurisdictions even these are permitted. 116

The

absolute ownership doctrine has been criticized
because it fails to take into account the nature
of ground water and because it favors municipalities and other large users who are able to
drill deep wells, even though they often cut off
the supply of water from the shallow wells of
117
others.
The American or reasonable use rule limits a
landowner's use of ground water to beneficial
purposes having a reasonable relationship to the
use of overlying land,

118

but without regard to

adverse effects on adjacent landowners.

Use of

the water on nonoverlying lands, however, is
unreasonable and actionable if it injures the

. . .
l an d owner. 119
ground water supp 1 yo f an a d Joining
Even though the use is wasteful or the water is
used on nonoverlying lands, the plaintiff must show
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an injury or a threatened injury to his ground

·
· an action.
.
120
· or d er t o maintain
wa t er supp 1 yin
Under the correlative rights doctrine, or
California rule, each owner over a common pool
has an equal and correlative right to make a
beneficial use of the water on his overlying

1 an.
d

121

The use of the water must be reasonable

in relation to the rights and needs of neighboring landowners.

Priority of use is unimportant

since in time of shortage the common supply is
apportioned among the overlying owners on the basis
of their reasonable needs.

122

The correlative

rights doctrine, in fact, is similar to the doctrine of reasonable use that applies to contained
surface waters and underground streams.
Finally, some western states apply their prior
appropriation system to percolating ground water,
This rule gives priority to the landowner who
first puts the ground water to beneficial use,
Thus, the first landowner to take the water will
be the last to be cut off in time of shortages.

123

Scientific understanding of the relationship
between surface and ground waters has emphasized
the defects of the common law classification
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system - a system which has received much criticism from both hydrolci.gists and legal commentators, 124
Any water pumped from wells under equlibrium conditions is necessarily diverted into the acquifer from somewhere
else, but not necessarily, from places
where it was of no use to anyone. There
are enough examples of streamflow depletion by pollution from wastes released by surface waters, to attest to
the close though veriable relation between surface water and ground water.
(b)

Consumptive Use Rules in Kentucky
Kentucky has long recognized the legal

distinction between underground streams and percolating ground water.

In Nourse v. Andrews,

125

a plaintiff owning land on the Muddy River in Logan
County tried to stop the city of Russellville from
using two springs for its water supply since this
caused the river to be depleted,

The plaintiff

argued that the springs were part of the source of
the river, but lost the case because he was unable
to prove this allegation.

The court stated that

one who alleges the existence of an underground
stream has the burden of proof on that issue.
court added that:

The

126

Subterranean streams, as distinguished
from subterranean percolations, are

33

governed by the same rules, following
surface streams, , , , The owner of
the land under which a stream flows
can, therefore, maintain an action
for the diversion of it, if such diversion took place under the same circumstances as would have enabled him to
recover, if the stream had been wholly
above ground,
Therefore, according to the Nourse case, a
landowner may assert riparian rights to underground
water if he can prove the existence of an underground stream.

In Commonwealth v, Sebastian, 127

such proof was established by pointing to a line
of green grass which flourished in spite of dry
weather.

The Court in Sebastian also stated that

"there is an initial presumption that subterranean
waters are percolating, but once a subterranean
stream is shown to exist, there arises a presumption
that it has a fixed and definite course and channe 1 " , 128
In the case of percolating ground water, Kentucky originally followed the absolute ownership
rule,

In Kinnard v, Standard Oil Co.,

129

the

court stated that percolating waters "belong to
the soil, constitute part of it, and may be used,
controlled, or removed by the owner in the same
manner that he could the soil through which the
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water percolates or runs".

120

In Long v. Louisville

& Nashville Railway Co., 131 the court declared that
"The rule is universal that the owner may dig on his
own land such wells as he needs, although in doing
so he may dig up his neighbor's well. u 132
This doctrine was reaffirmed in Nourse v.
Andrews: 133
Percolating waters are part of the earth
itself, as much as the soil and stones,
with the same absolute right of use and
appropriation by the owner of the land
• . • . The law seems to be well settled that water percolating through the
soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished
from the soil itself. The owner of the
soil is entitled to the waters percolating
through it, and such water is not subject to the appropriation.
The absolute ownership rule, however, was replaced
by the American rule of reasonable use in Sycamore
Coal v. Stanley.

134

In this action, plaintiff

brought suit because the defendant coal company's
core hole (used to test for coal) caused the water
in his well to disappear.

The defendant plugged

the hole, but the water rose only 14 inches, as
compared to the previous 54-inch level.

The

court found no evidence to establish the existence
of an underground stream, and, therefore,
the waters to be percolating.
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assumed

The plaintiff

received no damages, and the Kentucky court adopted the American rule of reasonable use for future
disputes over the use of percolating waters.
The rule adopted in Sycamore Coal Co, limited
the landowner over subterranean percolating waters
to a •reasonable and beneficial use of the
waters • • • , and he has no right to wastE them,
whether through malice or indifference, if, by
such waste, he injures a neighboring landowner.•

135

Since the landowner's use was "properly connected
with the use, enjoyment and development of the
land itself,'' the Court held that he was entitled
to all he could use, regardless of the depletion
of his neighbor's supply.
Rights to the use of ground water can be
impaired by means of contamination as well as through
diversion or depletion.

For instance, Kinnard v.

136 a 11 owe d a spring
'
owner t o
S tandar d 01'l Co.
recover damages from the defendant because defendant's coal oil storage tanks leaked and polluted plaintiff's spring, which was fed by percolating waters.

In accord is Rogers v. Bond

Brothers, 137 where the court quoted from Cooley
on Torts:

138
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It is said in an early case that where
one has filthy deposits on his premises,
he whose dirt it is must keep it that
it may not trespass.
Therefore, if
filthy matter from a privy or other
place of deposit percolates through the
soil of the adjacent premises, or breaks
through into the neighbor's cellar, or
finds its way into his well, this is
a nuisance.
However, in United Fuel Gas co. v. Sawyers,

139

a gas company defendant was not held liable when
a newly-drilled gas well contaminated the plaintiff's
home water source.

The Court declared that "the

owner of land when putting it to a legitimate and
not unreasonable use is not liable to the 01,mer
of adjoining land for injuries to well or springs
fed by hidden underground waters. 11140
Although Kentucky now follows the American
or reasonable use rule, serious consideration
should be given to the Eastern "correlative rights"
rule, where each landowner's right to percolating
water "is a co-equal usufructuary right and,
therefore, correlative,

11141

This rule would

provide for a more uniform approach to both
surface

and ground waters.

Unlike the reasonable

use rule, the user in the correlative rights
jurisdictions is required to compare the equities
of conflicting uses.

37

This is the most important

important characteristic of the rule, because
unlike Kentucky's present rule, it does not leave
property owners who may be dependent on percolating waters without any protection.
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4.

DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER

Diffused surface waters are those waters
resulting from falling rain or melting snow, or
those rising to the surface in springs, which
have not collected in a lake or pond or natural
watercourse and are still in a diffused state or
condition.

142

Water which overflows the bank of

a natural watercourse and follows the course of the
stream to its outlet, or which on subsidence returns to the stream, is considered to be part of
the watercourse from which it comes and not diffused surface water.

143

Likewise, water which

overflows the banks of a lake but which remains
connected to the lake, or flows through the natural outlet of the lake is a defined path into
another body of water, or returns to the lake, is
144
However, flood
not diffused surface water.
waters which entirely lose their connection with
a lake or stream and spread out over the adjoining
country and settle in low places and become stag145
nant are treated as diffused surface waters.
Normally a landowner has an absolute right to
any diffused surface water on his property, and he
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may impound this water and prevent it from flowing into the property of an adjoining landowner. 146
14 7
' d th'is d octrine,
'
S ome commen t a t ors h ave cri't'icize
but only New Hampshire has restricted the consumptive use of such waters, 148

At the present

time, the disposal of unwanted diffused surface
water is more important than the regulation of
its consumptive use,
on this issue:

There are three positions

(1) the common enemy rule;

(2) the

civil law rule; and (3) the reasonable use rule.
(al

Common Enemy Rule
Under the common enemy rule, a landowner may

dispose of diffused surface water on his land
regardless of injury to his neighbor.

This rule

originated in the right of a landowner to use his
property as he pleases,

149

but has been justified

on the basis of the right to fight the "common
enemy",lSO and on the ground that it encourages
land improvement and cultivation.

151

The common-

enemy rule, however, has undergone some modification in the past hundred years.

The modern

common-enemy rule allows the landowner to obstruct
or divert surface water only if the obstruction or
diversion is related to ordinary use, improvement
or protection of his land, and is done without
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.
ma 1 ice
or neg l'igence, 152
(bl

Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule is expressed by the maxim

"aqua currit et debet currere, ut solebat es jure
na turae, "

(Water runs and should run, as it is

wont to do, by natural right,)

153

According to

the civil law rule, the upper owner has an easement upon the lower owner's land for diffused
surface water to drain in its natural manner, 154
and the lower owner may not obstruct the flow
to the injury of the upper owner,
The advantage of the civil law rule is that
rights thereunder are readily predictable,but
strictly applied, the rule may inhibit the development and improvement of land.

To avoid this dan-

ger the civil law rule has been modified in many
jurisdictions,

For example, the rule usually

permits the upper owner to enhance the drainage
of his property to some degree, particularly for
agricultural purposes.

155

Moreover, the upper

owner may normally hasten the flow of water by
natural drainage, if he can do so in a reasonable
manner. 156

Finally, since a strict prohibition

against leveling or filling property wouid substantially hinder the improvement and development

41

of urban porperty, the courts frequently except
city lots from the application of the civil law
rule.
(cl

157
Reasonable Use Rule

The more recently developed rule of reasonable
use occupies the middle ground between the original
common enemy and civil law rules and produces a
result similar to the modified versions of each. 158
The rule, adopted by the Restatement of Torts,
provides that liability for invasion of a person's
interest in the use and enjoyment of his land
resulting from interference with the natural or
normal flow of surface waters depends on whether
the action, if intentional, was unreasonable, or if
unintentional, was negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.
(d)

159

Diffused Surface Water in Kentucky
At first Kentucky applied the conventional

"civil law" rule for diffused surface waters.

This
160
approach was employed in Pickerill v. Louisville,
a 1907 case, in which a lower landowner raised the
foundation of his land to avoid effects of diffused
surface waters.

This caused the upper landowner's

privy to overflow.

In its opinion, the court
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stated:

161
•
• this.
• court has adopted
in respect to such cases as this rule
of the civil law, which only subjects
the lower estate to the easement or
servitude of receiving the natural
flow of surface water from the upper
estate , • • the owner of the lower
ground has no right to erect embankments,
or create other obstructions, whereby
the natural flow of surface water from
the upper ground is stopped or caused
to back upon and overflow the upper
ground. On the other hand, the owner
of the upper ground has no right to
make excavations, barriers, or drains
upon his ground by which the flow of
surface water is diverted from its
natural channel and a new channel made
on the lower ground, nor can he collect
into our channel waters usually flowing
off into his neighbor's land by several
channels and thereby increase the flow
upon the lower ground.

For many years the civil law rule announced in
Pickerill was consistently followed by the Court
of Appeals. 162
Klutey v. Commonwealth,

163

a 1967 case,

marked a change in Kentucky's approach to diffused
surface waters.

Klutey involved a suit by the

Commonwealth to enjoin property owners from maintaining embankments on their property which were
designed to divert the flow of water from two
drainage pipes under a state road,

The accelerated

flow of water from the drainage pipes caused ex-
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tensive erosion and flooding and so the property owners constructed embankments to protect
their land.

This, however, caused the water to

back up on the highway.

When the owners were

ordered to remove the embankments, they argued
that under the civil law rule the Commonwealth
could not change the natural drainage of the
land if such actions would accelerate the flow
and cause damage to their property.
The court pointed out that the "civil law"
rule failed to consider the socially desirable
uses of the property or the extent of damage one
property owner might cause his neighbor.

Thus,

the court announced that Kentucky would follow
the reasonable use rule:

"In substance the rule

balances the reasonableness of the use by the
upper owner against the severity of damage to
the lower owner." 164
The court in Klutey recognized the potential
problems in a test for reasonableness, and adopted
the standard set forth in the Minnesota case of
Enderson v. Kelehan:

165

• • • the rule is that in effecting a
reasonable use of his land for a legitimate purpose a landowner, acting in
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good faith, may drain his land of surface
waters which would otherwise have never
gone that way but would have remained
on the land until they were absorbed by
the soil or evaporated in the air if
(al

there is a reasonable necessity
for such drainage;

(bl

reasonable care be taken to
avoid unnecessary injury to the
land receiving the burden;

(cl

the utility or benefit accuring
to the land drained reasonably
outweighs the gravity of the
harm resulting to the land receiving the burden; and

(dl

where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably improved and aiding the normal
and natural system of drainage
according to its reasonable
carrying capacity, or if,
in the absence of a practicable
natural drain, a reasonable
and feasible artificial drainage system is adopted,

Commonwealth v. Baird 166

further refined

Klutey•s reasonable use test by stating that the
question of reasonableness of the upper owner's
use of his land against the harm to the lower
owner from such use is a matter for the jury, except
in extreme cases where the liability may be determined as a matter of law,
Cases since Klutey indicate that the 'reasonable
use" test, as a practical matter, has not changed
the main characteristics of the "civil law" rule,
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The "reasonable use" test, as set forth in
Klutey, is a more flexible standard which can be
applied where necessity or utility dictates,
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5.

(a)

STATE REGULATION OF WATER RESOURCES

Water Resources Administration in Kentucky
The riparian system has been criticized because

it restricts the use of stream water to riparian owners
and because it limits the use of the water to riparian
170
land.
Another undesirable feature is the uncertain
171
nature of water rights under the riparian system;
in many jurisdictions the extent of a riparian's right
of reasonable use can be determined only by litiga172
tion.
These concerns have led to the statutory
modification of common law riparianism in a number of
eastern states.

Under these statutes water use is

regulated by a state administrative under some form
173
of permit system.
Kentucky made the first significant legislative
change in its riparian system in 1954.

The droughts

of the two preceding years caused many farmers to turn
to the streams and lakes bordering their land to satisfy their needs ..

The increased use of riparian water

demonstrated the need for a more satisfactory definition of riparian rights in Kentucky.

With this in

mind, the legislature set forth in the 1954 act a
basic statement of the rights of landowners in such
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174
waters.

The statute also provided for the Legis-

lative Research Commission to make a thorough study
of all problems relati~g to water resources and to
report its findings to the 1956 legislature.
The act applied to "public water" which included
contained surface water and ground water, but not
diffused surface water.

Section 3 of the act set

forth the rights of landowners to use the public
waters of the state.

The act provided that the use

of water by a riparian owner for domestic purposes
would have priority over other uses and declared
that riparian owners "shall have a right to make such
reasonable use of the water for other than domestic
purposes as will not deny the use of such water to
other owners for domestic purposes or impair existing uses of other owners heretofore established, or
unreasonably interfere with a beneficial use by other
owners".

Finally, the act allowed riparians under

certain conditions to impound and store water on their
land as long as this would not injure the rights of
175
other users.
In 1966 the •)lder act was replaced by a more
comprehensive piece of legislation, KRS chapter 151.
This legislation, administered by the Department for
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Natural Resources and Environmental Protection,
attempts to deal with the state's water resources
on a coordinated and comprehensive basis.

Consump-

tive uses of water are regulated by a permit system.
The construction of dams and impoundments is also
controlled by the agency.

In addition, the legis-

lation authorizes water resources planning and construction for flood control and water development
purposes.
The Division of Water Resources within the
Department for Natural Resources and Environmental
176
Originally, the
Protection administers the act.
Division of Water Resources performed both adjudieatery and planning functions.

The first five years

of the Division's operation concentrated on the
gathering of data and the study of federal water
plans.

The data collected was designed to provide

the factual basis necessary to coordinate the plan177
The Division's most
ning for Kentucky's water.
important function was implementation of the state's
water plans, and it·was empowered to issue permits
178
for the use of water in Kentucky.
The 1974 General Assembly transferred some of
the Division's regulatory powers to the Department
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of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
179
and the Commissioner of that agency.
However,
the Division retains the power to allocate water in
180
times of shortage
and to issue permits for dams
181
within the commonwealth.
KRS 151.330(1) created the Water Resources
Authority of the Commonwealth.

A 1974 amendment

lists the following persons as members of the Authority:

the governor, the commissioner of Natural

Resources and Environmental Protection, the secretary for finance and administration, the commissioner
of health, the commissioner of commerce, the commissioner of agriculture, the attorney general, the
secretary of the department of transportation, the
commission of fish and wildlife resources, and the
commissioner of parks, none of whom are compensated
for their duties.

The Authority is "empowered to

coordinate the programs of all state agencies in the
conservation, development, and wise use of public
182
and to simultaneously "promote the benefiwater,
cial and proper distribution of water throughout the
183
Its chief function, however, is to contract
state.
with the federal government, primarily the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, to obtain water supply space in
184
existing federal projects.
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The agencies mentioned in KRS 151 are only
two of the many agencies and governmental bodies
which affect Kentucky's water resources,

The

governor's cabinet maintains planning responsibility
of water matters in Kentucky. 185

Pollution matters

are under the control of the Water Pollution Control
Commission, which is within the Department of Health.
This commission was created in KRS Chapter 224, and
it has a permit system whereby polluters must first
obtain a permit before discharging waste into
state waters.
Agencies on a local level with responsibilities
relating to water resources development or control
include:

(ll drainage, levee, and reclamation
186
districts;
(2) soil and water conservation
districts;

187

(3)

watershed conservancy dis-

189
188 C4l fl oo d contro 1 d.istricts
.
·
tricts;
an d ci·t·ies;
and (5) water districts.

190

The Water Resources Act also deals with flood
control and water development.

Before any party

in Kentucky can construct any dam, levee, dike, or
other obstruction across a stream, he must submit
plans to the Div_sion of Water Resources and
191
app 1 y f or a permi•t •
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Th e same rue
1 app 1·ies t o

any building, barrier, or other obstruction which
will result in distrubing the flow of the
stream.

192

The 1974 General Assembly established strict
criteria for periodic, five-year safety inspections of dams, levees, or other obstructions restricting water flow in Kentucky.

193

Such in-

spections emphasize safety and non-interference
with beneficial uses of othe.r water users.

Stiff

penalties are provided for those who fail to
comply with the standards set by the Department
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.
The Department may take full charge of the unsafe
dam, correct the situation, and charge all costs
to the owner of the dam.

The owner's property is

subject to a foreclosure sale if payment is not
made.
The pennit system for dam construction, is
weakened by several exceptions.

First, the

Division has no control over dams or obstructions
"which are not of such size or type as to require approval by the division in the interest of
safety or retenLion of water supply".

194

The

1974 General Assembly was more specific, when it
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defined dam as: 195
• • any artificial barrier, including
appurtenant works, which does or can
impound or divert water, and which
either (1) is or will be twenty-five
(25) feet or more in height from the
natural bed of the stream or watercourse
at the downstream toe of the barrier,
as determined by the department, or
(2) has or will have an impounding
capacity at maximum water storage
elevation of fifty (5) acre-feet or
more.
The primary exemption is extended to Kentucky
farmers: 196
Nothing in this section is intended to
give the division any jurisdiction or
control over the construction, reconstruction, improvement, enlargement,
ditch, or system established for
agricultural purpose, or to require
approval of the same except where such
obstruction of the stream or floodway
is determined by the division to be a
detriment or hindrance to the beneficial
use of water resources in the area • .
Other parts of KRS 151 are concerned with the
financing of state water projects.

A special

revolving trust fund, known as the water resources
fund, has been established, from which the Water
Resources Authority is authorized to make loans
and expenditures.

147

The loans are available

to any "country <!ity, water district, watershed
conservancy district, or other governmental subdivision,"198 and their interest is determined
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by the Authority, and they must be secured.

199

In

addition, the Authority is authorized to issue
revenue bonds for the purpose of paying all or
.
200
part of such proJects.
(bl

Regulation of Consumptive Use·s of Water
in Kentucky~
~ ~~
KRS 151.110 states that it is the policy of the

Cormnonwealth "to protect the rights of all persons
equitably and reasonably interested in the use
and availability of water."
mented

This policy is imple-

by a permit system under which consumptive

water uses are regulated by the Division of Water
Resources.

KRS 151.140 provides that "No person,

business, industry, city, county, water district,
or other political subdivision has been granted
a permit by the division for such withdrawal,
diversion or transfer of water,"
Unless otherwise exempted, all parties, public
or private, must register with the Division and
apply for a permit to withdraw, divert, or transfer
public water.

The agency conducts an investigation

to determine that "the quantity, time, place, or
rate of withdraw2~. of public water will not be
detrimental to the public interest or rights
of other public water users."
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To date about 800 permits have been granted.
Permit holders are required to keep daily records
of their withdrawals and submit quarterly reports
to the agency.

The Division is also empowered to

inspect withdrawal records to determine whether
such records are correct and in proper order.

KRS

151.170 provides that the permits shall be specific
in terms of quantity, time, and rate of diversion,
transfer or withdrawal.

Although there is no

durational limit on their effectiveness, the permits are not necessarily perpetual, nor do they
create any rights of priority in times of water
shortage.

Instead, KRS 151.200 (ll authorizes

the Division, with the approval of the Water Resources Authority, to make temporary allocations
of available public water among users in times
of droughts, shortages or emergency situations.
The Kentucky statute departs substantially
from the riparian system by allowing nonriparian
owners to obtain permits.

KRS 151.200 (2) allows

the transfer or diversion of water from one
watershed to another.

Moreover, no express

restriction is placed on the transfer of water
rights as long as the nature or location of the
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of the diversion is not changed.
The scope of the permit system is limited
in several respects.

The first limitation stems

from the definition of "public waters".

Diffused

surface waters and waters "left standing in
natural pools in a natural stream when the natural flow of the stream has ceased" are excluded
from the definition of public water by KRS 151,120
(2) and are thus unregulated.
In addition, KRS 151,140 expressly exempts:
(1) domestic users;

(2) agricultural users, in-

cluding irrigators;

(3) uses exempted by admin-

istrative regulation;

(4) stream generating plants;

and (5) water injected underground in connection
with oil and gas production.
The exemption for domestic use reflects the
high priority given to such uses under riparian
dictrine.

Domestic uses are exempted from

regulation in most states,

KRS 151.100 (10)

defines "domestic use" as "the use of water for
ordinary household purposes, and drinking water
for poultry, livestock and domestic animals."
The exemptioP nor agricultre is more significant.

Irrigation in Kentucky in 1970 averaged

about seven million gallons of water per day
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on 25,000 acres of land,
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Tobacco is the

principal crop using irrigation waters, and if a
drought year occurs,

some 36,000 acres would

require 4,320,000,000 gallons of water.
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The

exemption is due largely to the efforts of the
Farm Bureau which views with extreme alarm any
regulation of farm ~ctivities,

Nevertheless,

this exemption is a major weakness in the regulatory scheme.
No permit is required "if the amount of water
withdrawn, diverted or transferred is less than
the amount established by regulation

"

This

exemption was created as a result of an amendment
in 1974 to KRS 151.140 requested by the agency.
The agency now exempts from the permit system
those who use less than 10,000 gallons per day.
The 1966 act orginally exempted many manufacturing and industrial users from the permit
requirements, provided that the water was returned in substantially the sanequantity and
condition as i t was when withdrawn.

This pro-

vision was repealed in 1972, leaving only
stream-generatL1g facilities still exempt.
Finally, the use of water for secondary recov-
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ery operations continues to be exempt from the
permit requirements.
There are a number of weaknesses in Kentucky's
water regulatory system.

For example, water re-

source development authority is fragmented among
various state and local agencies,

There is no

clear relationship between the regulatory permit
system and a comprehensive state water use plan. 205
The permit system itself is subject to serious
criticism.

At the administrative level, formal

procedures available to applicants or other interested parties to contest the grant or denial
of a permit could be made somewhat more elaborate.
In addition, the agency should be given authority
to settle disputes among water users.

Finally, a

process by which water can be set aside for future
public uses such as conservation, recreation,
water quality control or public water supply should
be established.
The large number of statutorily exempted users
undermines effective use of the agency's regulatory
power and renders the permit system useless as a
means of effectu~ting any meaningful water use
policy.

Moreover, the permit system as it presently

operates, does not allocate water among competing
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users in a fair and efficient manner.

This is

largely because rights to water vis a vis other
users are not clearly defined.
Water rights under KRS Chapter 151 are similar
in some respects to those in a prior appropriation
jurisdiction.

As in the West, the right to water

under the permit system is based on priority in
time and beneficial use.

KRS 151.170 (2) provides

that no permit shall be denied toa responsible
applicant who is willing to put the water to a useful purpose as long as water is available.

The

Kentucky statute, although it does not specifically
adopt a "beneficial use" standard, in effect utilizes this approach since any productive use
qualifies and no attempt is made to establish preferential use categories.

The element of priority

is important in Kentucky because existing permit
users (and riparian users exempt from regulation)
are protected against subsequent permit applicants.
The agency can only grant permits where water is
available and apparently cannot revoke a permit
in order to make water available to another
applicant.

Thu,, as far as the initiation of a

water use is concerned, "first in time is first
in right."
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The relationship between existing permitees
and unregulated riparian users needs clarification.
What happens when an unregulated riparian

owner

increases his water use, or makes a new use, and
this interferes with a permitee?

For example, if

a farmer begins to make a withdrawal of water
for purposes of irrigation, an unregulated use,
is his right to the water superior to that of
the permittee?

Must both the riparian user

and the perrnittee adjust their water use in accordance with the common-law reasonable use rule or is
the right of the riparian superior to that of the
permittee {or vice versa)?

In the hypothetical

case discussed above, would it make any difference
if the permittee was a nonriparian user?

Conflicts

of this nature are certain to arise eventually in
Kentucky and will probably have to be settled by
litigation.
In times of water shortage, a term which is not
defined, KRS 151.200 {1) allows the Division of
Water Resources to suspend the operation of the
permit system and make temporary allocations of
water among permittees on some other basis.
This provision raises two questions:
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(1) What is

the relationship between riparians and permittees
during periods of water shortage? and (2) What is
the relationship among the various permittees during periods of water shortage?
The relationship between riparians and permittees
has already been discussed,

Since the agency has

no authority to regulate exempt users even during
periods of water shortage, the courts must decide
whether unregulated riparian users must accommodate
permittees during such periods and if so, on what
terms.
The relationship between permit users is
also left very vague under the Kentucky statute.
Under prior appropriation the right to water
during periods of shortage (as well as any other
time) are based on priority in time,

No attempt

is made to pro-rate water use but instead the
senior appropriator

may take his full amount

before a junior appropriator is entitled to any
water at all.

Although this rule is harsh at

times it provides an element of certainty that is
lacking under both the riparian system and Kentucky's
statutory framew'Jrk.

KRS 151.200 (1) gives neither

the agency nor permits users any indication of the
basis upon which water will be allocated among
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permittees during periods of water shortage.

This

is a very serious defect in the Kentucky legislation.
An important objective of any permit system is to
provide a degree of certainty in the water allocation process so that water users can make intelligent investment decisions.

In Kentucky, this

element of certainty is lacking because the water
user cannot rely on his permit right at the very
time he needs i t most.
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CONCLUSION

The law of water rights in Kentucky is a complex
and sometimes uncertain mixture of common law doctrine and regulatory legislation.

Both the common-

law and the statutory aspects of Kentucky system of
water allocation are in need of modification.

In

the former case, the archaic distinction between
ground water and surface water consumptive use rules
should be abolished.

Since Kentucky now follows the

reasonable use rule with respect to contained surface
waters (and underground streams}, the adoption of the
correlative rights rule with respect to percolating
ground water would provide the Commonwealth with a
uniform standard for all non-regulated consumptive
uses.
Some changes are also desirable for Kentucky's
statutory framework.

The statute's broad exemption

provisions should be modified or eliminated, and the
rights of water permit holders should be clarified.
The dual system of water rights which now prevails
between permittees and non-regulated riparians inhibits maximum productive use of water and promises to
create severe administrative problems for the agency
during periods of water shortage.

63

Finally, the state must continue, and perhaps
increase, its water resource planning activities.
Comprehensive planning must include both water quality and consumptive use needs, and must be coordinated with federal, state and local land use policies.
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